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THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF REGULATION  
IN PROMOTING  
EQUITY MARKET COMPETITION 
Daniel M. Gray* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
November 2006 was a particularly good time for a symposium to 
evaluate equity market structure. In the United States, the equity markets 
were entering the final stages of implementation for Regulation NMS. 
Adopted in June 2005, Regulation NMS embodies changes to market 
structure that are designed to enhance and modernize the national market 
system adopted under section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ‘34 Act).1 Regulation NMS includes a trade-through rule that generally 
prevents a market from executing trades at prices inferior to automated 
quotes that are displayed and immediately accessible at other markets.2 
Over the last two years, the U.S. equity markets have been transformed. 
There are ten registered securities exchanges in the U.S., and nine of the ten 
have adopted new equity trading systems. Perhaps most notably, the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the largest equity market in the world, has 
fully automated its quote for the first time in its history. The exchanges 
brought their new trading systems into full operation on March 5, 2007.3 
In Europe, as well, the state of competition among equity exchanges is 
in flux. As the economic boundaries between European countries have 
blurred, so have the boundaries between the traditional national stock 
exchanges. Several smaller exchanges have already merged, and there has 
been a continuing dance involving potential mergers among the “Big 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Senior Special Counsel for Market Structure, Division of Market Regulation, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of 
policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Commission or of the author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. The views expressed 
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the 
author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. 
 1. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005) 
(adopting release). 
 2. Regulation NMS Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2006). Rule 611 replaces an older trade-
through rule that had applied to securities listed on exchanges other than Nasdaq. Rule 611 
updates the old rule by extending trade-through protection only to automated quotes, in contrast to 
the old rule that protected both automated and manual quotes. In addition, Rule 611 applies  
to stocks listed on all exchanges, including Nasdaq. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg.  
at 37,501–02. 
 3. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 53,829, 71 Fed. Reg. 30,038, 30,039 (May 
24, 2006) (setting compliance dates for Regulation NMS). See also Regulation NMS, Exchange 
Act Release No. 55,160, 72 Fed. Reg. 4202 (Jan. 30, 2007) (extending the Trading Phase Date 
until March 5, 2007). 
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Three” European exchanges—the London Stock Exchange (LSE), Deutsche 
Börse AG, and Euronext N.V.4 More recently, of course, the U.S. 
exchanges have entered the mix with their own proposals for cross-Atlantic 
mergers.5 In addition to this merger activity among existing exchanges, the 
scheduled implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) in November 2007 raises the potential that a transformed 
regulatory environment may create a more meaningful opportunity for new 
competitors to challenge the Big Three for market share in Europe. As a 
result, the next few years will offer up a wealth of new data for evaluating 
the effects of regulatory initiatives on competition in the equity markets. 
The topic of the panel I spoke on at the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, 
Financial & Commercial Law symposium was entitled: The Respective 
Roles of Government and Competition in Shaping and Developing the 
Markets. The panel discussed the extent to which competition rather than 
government regulation should shape the markets. I want to turn those 
statements around and suggest that, in the absence of a regulatory scheme 
specifically designed to promote competition among multiple equity 
markets, there is unlikely to be significant competition because of the 
economic forces that drive markets toward consolidation. Both economic 
theory and historical experience suggest that a single equity market will 
eventually dominate trading in its listed stocks. Regulations, therefore, 
should be viewed as playing an essential role in preserving and promoting 
equity market competition. 
In examining this thesis, I will focus on three broad questions. First, 
given the powerful network effect that operates in the equity markets—best 
captured in the old maxim that liquidity attracts liquidity—is significant 
competition among equity markets for trading volume in the same stocks 
likely to exist in the absence of a regulatory scheme that makes such 
competition a primary objective? 
Second, assuming that regulation does indeed play an essential role in 
promoting competition among equity markets, what regulatory tools are 
most effective in promoting competition, without losing the economic good 
that underlies the network effect (the best prices for investors)? 
Finally, are regulatory efforts to promote competition among equity 
markets actually worth it? I will examine whether the benefits of such 
                                                                                                                 
 4. U.K. COMPETITION COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF LONDON 
STOCK EXCHANGE PLC BY DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG OR EURONEXT NV, 3–4, 22–24, 44 (Nov. 2005) 
[hereinafter U.K. COMPETITION REPORT]. 
 5. As this article goes to press, it appears that the proposed merger of the NYSE and 
Euronext will be completed, while Nasdaq’s tender offer for the LSE has not been accepted  
by LSE shareholders. Press Release, NYSE Euronext to Commence Offer for Euronext Shares  
(Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1171453128510.html (announcing 
commencement of offer for Euronext shares); Press Release, Nasdaq, Final Offers Lapsed  
(Feb. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/newsroomnewsHeadlines. 
aspx?year= (follow “Final Offers Lapsed”) (announcing lapse of final offer for LSE shares). 
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competition exceed the costs of fragmenting the buying and selling interest 
in individual stocks, particularly by focusing on three historical events that 
offer empirical evidence to help assess this question. 
II. IS REGULATION ESSENTIAL FOR EQUITY MARKET 
COMPETITION? 
One of the primary statutory objectives for the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is to ensure fair competition among exchange markets, 
and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange markets.6 
Competition in this context refers to competition among multiple markets to 
attract trading volume in the same stocks. Markets compete in this way by 
offering better trading services to investors, such as low access fees, reliable 
systems, and innovative trading tools.7 This type of competition is distinct 
from competition for listings, where the quality of trading services may be 
but one of many factors that influence an issuer’s decision on where to list 
initially and whether to switch listings. In contrast, the quality of a market’s 
trading services is more likely to be vitally important to actual traders and 
investors than it is to company management. 
When evaluating the issue of equity market competition, the starting 
point is the principle that “liquidity attracts liquidity”—known in economic 
terms as a “network effect.”8 As a single market attracts more and more 
trading volume in a stock, each new participant in that market enhances the 
value of the market to both existing and prospective participants by adding 
liquidity and thereby enabling that market to offer better prices. After an 
initial period of potentially vigorous competition among multiple markets, 
liquidity can be expected to tip to a single market and stick there 
indefinitely. Because of this network effect, any market attempting to 
compete with the dominant market faces a tough challenge. Even if the new 
competitor offers better technology and lower fees, it may not attract 
trading volume because it cannot assure its participants that they will 
receive prices that match the quality of executions available on the 
dominant market. Moreover, the dominant market may respond to 
competitive challenges by reducing fees in the short-term until a competitor 
is driven off, or by adopting an improved technology that was developed 
and introduced by the competitor. 
The consequences of the network effect can be seen today by assessing 
the equity markets throughout the world. The network effect appears to be 
alive and well. In countries other than the U.S., the major equity exchanges 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2000). 
 7. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390; 
Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,582 (Feb. 28, 2000). 
 8. See LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 526, 535–36 (2003). 
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overwhelmingly dominate public trading in their listed stocks. Examples 
include the LSE in the United Kingdom; the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 
Japan; Deutsche Börse in Germany; Euronext in France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Portugal; and the Toronto Stock Exchange in Canada. 
In contrast, the U.S. equity markets currently are characterized by 
extremely vigorous competition among a variety of different types of 
markets for trading volume in the same stocks. For example, the NYSE 
floor, which historically has dominated trading in NYSE stocks, has seen its 
market share diminish in recent months. To counter the trend, the NYSE 
has adopted a Hybrid Market that offers fully automated access to its 
displayed quotes. Of course, the NYSE also has merged with the fully 
automated Archipelago Exchange, but the NYSE Group has decided to 
maintain both entities as separate exchanges that simultaneously trade 
NYSE stocks on different trading platforms.9 Therefore, to some extent the 
two trading platforms operating under the NYSE Group umbrella will be 
competing with each other for volume in NYSE stocks. 
For its part, Nasdaq has been approved as an exchange, has merged 
with two competitor ECNs, and has integrated the respective three trading 
systems into a single system with superior technology than its old system. 
Nasdaq has increased its share of trading in NYSE stocks by, among other 
things, offering low-cost routing to the NYSE floor for orders that check the 
Nasdaq order book first.10 
The American Stock Exchange (Amex), like the NYSE, is transforming 
a manual floor-based market into a hybrid market with primarily automated 
trading.11 The four traditionally “regional” exchanges—Chicago, Boston, 
Philadelphia, and National—have all received capital infusions from major 
securities firms wary of a potential NYSE/Nasdaq duopoly that would 
dominate trading in U.S. equities.12 The regionals have adopted new, 
automated equity trading systems and believe that they have their best 
opportunity in many years to compete effectively for trading volume with 
the larger exchanges. Similarly, “[t]he two traditionally options 
exchanges—CBOE [the Chicago Board Options Exchange] and ISE [the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. NYSE Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4–5 (2005). 
 10. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 22–26 (Nov. 8, 2006), 
available at http://excite.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHTML1? 
SessionID=dqUgjAWGR6-FQ1D&ID=4750663; Nasdaq Membership Frequently Asked 
Questions (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader/er/er_faqs.pdf. 
 11. Press Release, AMEX, American Stock Exchange’s New Electronic Trading Platform 
Compliant With Regulation NMS (March 5, 2007), available at http://www.amex.com/ 
?href=/atamex/news/press/sn_AEMIRegNMS_030507.htm. 
 12. Emily Lambert, Could Small Mean Big? Why Regional Exchanges Are Heating Up, 
FORBES.COM, July 3, 2006, http://members.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0703/054b.html. 
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International Securities Exchange]—have decided to expand into [trading] 
equities and . . . [have adopted] new, automated equity trading systems.”13 
Finally, in addition to the ten registered securities exchanges, a variety 
of alternative trading systems (ATSs) compete for trading volume in U.S. 
stocks. Three electronic communications networks (ECNs) publicly display 
their quotes through the National Association of Securities Dealers’ 
(NASD’s) Alternative Display Facility, and a large number of other ATSs 
operate “dark” pools of liquidity. These dark ATSs include crossing 
systems that facilitate block trading by institutional investors, as well as 
liquidity pools operated by broker-dealers that seek to match orders 
internally prior to any interaction with the transparent, public markets.14 
The United States and other countries have contrasting expectations for 
a competitive equity market structure. While market participants in other 
countries have long accepted dominant exchanges, many in the U.S. have 
expressed great concern over the prospect of a duopoly with trading 
dominated by the NYSE Group and Nasdaq. This concern to maintain a 
competitive market structure reflects a fundamental policy choice of the 
U.S. regulatory scheme.15 The Exchange Act directs the SEC to facilitate 
the establishment of a national market system (NMS).16 The NMS is made 
up of multiple markets that simultaneously trade the same stocks. One of 
the primary NMS objectives is to ensure fair competition among broker-
dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and non-
exchange markets.17 
This NMS approach to market structure is an attempt to have your cake 
and eat it too. On the one hand, investors in the United States want to have 
the benefits of competition among markets (such as innovative trading tools 
and low trading fees). But on the other hand, they want to minimize any 
adverse effects of “fragmentation”—when the buying and selling interest in 
individual stocks becomes so split up among multiple markets that it 
interferes with efficient pricing of those stocks.18 In this respect, the NMS 
“incorporates two distinct types of competition—competition among 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Annette L. Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the STA Annual Conference (Oct. 
13, 2006). See also John Authers & Norma Cohen, Clearing the Floor: How a Regulatory 
Overhaul Is Helping Rivals to Close in on the Big Board, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006 (noting that 
ISE launched its equity trading service in the Fall of 2006, while CBOE planned to launch  
in 2007). 
 14. Daniel Safarik, Illuminating the Dark, ADVANCED TRADING, Sept. 26, 2006, at 26, 28; 
Nina Mehta, Who’s Afraid of the Dark?, TRADERS MAGAZINE, May 2006, at 36, 40–41. 
 15. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.  
§§ 78a–78nn (2000)). 
 16. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78k-1(a)(2) (2000). 
 17. Exchange Act § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii). 
 18. Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange 
Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,577–78 (Feb. 28, 2000) (requesting comment on 
issues relating to market fragmentation). 
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individual markets and competition among [individual] orders.”19 The 
Commission’s market structure challenge over the years has been to 
maintain an appropriate balance between these two forms of competition.20 
III. WHICH REGULATORY TOOLS PROMOTE COMPETITION 
AND EFFICIENCY? 
The SEC has balanced the two objectives of competition among 
markets and competition among orders by utilizing familiar regulatory 
tools. They include price transparency, non-discriminatory access to 
markets, non-discriminatory access to clearing and settlement systems, and 
the duty of best execution. 
Mandatory price transparency helps non-dominant markets compete by 
enabling them to provide some assurance that their prices are as good as 
those offered by the dominant market. If the dominant market displays a 
quote to anyone, it is required to display that quote to the public.21 
Mandatory fair and non-discriminatory access to markets prevents a 
dominant market from restricting its prices to favored customers.22 Open 
access also prevents the dominant market from inhibiting traders from 
participating in other markets, such as through off-board trading 
restrictions.23 
In addition, market participants in the United States have fair and non-
discriminatory access to a national clearing and settlement system, no 
matter the particular market where a trade was executed. The extraordinary 
importance of this regulatory tool is apparent from the state of exchange 
competition in Europe, where individual markets own clearing and 
settlement systems as part of “vertical silos” in which trading services are 
effectively tied to clearance and settlement services.24 Notably, when 
Congress ordered the creation of a national system for trading stocks in 
1975, it also ordered the creation of a national system for clearing and 
settling trades.25 
Finally, the duty of best execution plays a vital role in promoting 
competition by creating incentives for brokers to search for the best 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Concerning Recent Developments 
in the Equity Markets Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
(May 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts051905whd.htm.  
 20. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,498–99 (June 29, 
2005) (adopting release). 
 21. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 
48,290 (Sept. 12, 1996). 
 22. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,540.  
 23. Off-board trading restrictions prevent an exchange’s members “from effecting transactions 
in [the exchange’s] listed securities away from a national securities exchange.” Commission 
Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act Release No. 
42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 28, 2000) (proposing rescission of NYSE Rule 390). 
 24. U.K. COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59, 67–70. 
 25. Exchange Act § 17A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a) (Supp. II 2002). 
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available markets.26 In some cases, brokers may be committed to a 
dominant market because of financial considerations or other self-interests, 
or just through plain inertia. The duty of best execution helps focus brokers 
on the interests of their customers in trading on the best market. This focus 
expands the opportunity for smaller markets to compete with a dominant 
market by offering better prices or trading services that brokers are legally 
required to consider. 
Many of these regulatory tools that promote competition also can 
minimize the adverse effects of fragmentation. For example, price 
transparency and open access help keep prices in line among all the 
different markets that trade a particular stock. If quoted prices diverge, the 
differences can immediately be arbitraged away. Public disclosure of order 
execution quality statistics by all markets is another important aspect of 
price transparency.27 This specialized disclosure supplements real-time 
quote and trade transparency by honing in on the quality of executions 
actually provided at different markets for different types of orders that 
otherwise could not be seen by the public. Comparable statistics on order 
execution quality both help equalize the prices available across markets and 
enable markets to compete more directly on the quality of their order 
executions by making this factor visible to brokers and customers.28 
IV. DO THE BENEFITS OF COMPETING EQUITY MARKETS 
OUTWEIGH THE COSTS OF REGULATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION? 
Multiple markets trading the same stocks are necessary to have a 
competitive market structure. But the severity of any adverse effects of 
fragmentation may increase as the number of competing markets increases. 
The regulatory tools mentioned in Part III can help direct order flow to 
markets that offer the best prices. These tools thereby minimize the most 
obvious risk of fragmentation, which is that an investor’s order will be 
executed at an inferior price in one market, while the best price was readily 
available in another market. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Order Execution Obligations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 48,322 (“A broker-dealer’s duty of best 
execution derives from common law agency principles and fiduciary obligations, and is 
incorporated both in SRO rules and, through judicial decisions, in the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws.”). 
 27. Regulation NMS Rule 605, 17 C.F.R. § 242.605 (2006). 
 28. See generally Ekkehart Boehmer, Robert Jennings & Li Wei, Public Disclosure and 
Private Decisions: Equity Market Execution Quality and Order Routing, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 315 
(2007) (examining whether public disclosure affects behavior and finding that it produces 
beneficial effects); Xin Zhao & Kee H. Chung, Information Disclosure and Market Quality: The 
Effect of SEC Rule 11Ac1-5 on Trading Costs, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=440429 (analyzing the impact of public disclosure and 
concluding that it encourages competition among market centers and reduces trading costs). 
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A deeper issue in evaluating a fragmented market structure, however, is 
whether its “best” prices are any good—particularly, whether the prices 
produced by a fragmented market structure are as good as the prices that 
would be produced by a more consolidated market structure. In other 
words, do the benefits of regulatory efforts to promote competition among 
multiple markets outweigh the excessive transaction costs that might be 
imposed on investors if fragmentation impaired price discovery for 
individual stocks? 
As an initial matter, one should not fail to recognize, or underestimate, 
the costs of a fragmented market structure merely because investor 
transaction costs can be difficult to calculate precisely. Institutional invest-
tors experience this difficulty acutely because they trade in large size. 
Institutional investors, such as mutual funds and retirement plans, represent 
the financial interests of millions of individuals by enabling them to invest 
indirectly in the equity markets. For institutional investors alone, the im-
plicit transaction costs associated with the prices at which their orders are 
executed has been estimated to be as high as 1% of the principal amount of 
their transactions.29 Dollar cost estimates range from a conservative $30 
billion to more than $100 billion annually. To provide a frame of reference, 
the total non-listing revenues of the NYSE Group and Nasdaq in 2005 were 
approximately $2.11 billion.30 Consequently, the potential benefits of com-
petition among markets in minimizing exchange fees are smaller by an 
order of magnitude than the potential costs to investors of impaired price 
discovery. 
This issue of the trade-off between competition and fragmentation can 
be endlessly debated in theory, depending on one’s views about optimal 
market structure. It is therefore interesting to look for relevant empirical 
data that might shed light on the issue. I will consider three historical 
periods that offer relevant natural experiments on the benefits and costs of 
competition among equity markets: first, in 1996, the entry of ECNs into 
the market for Nasdaq stocks following the Commission’s adoption of the 
Order Handling Rules; second, in 2004, the LSE’s initiation of the Dutch 
Trading Service (DTS) to compete with Euronext for trading in Dutch 
stocks; and third, also in 2004, the competition between the NYSE and 
Nasdaq to provide the most efficient market structure for trading their 
respective listed stocks. 
Prior to the Order Handling Rules, trading in Nasdaq stocks was di-
vided primarily between two markets: (1) the public dealer market operated 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,533, 37,608 n.990 
(June 29, 2005) (adopting release); Request for Comments on Measures to Improve Disclosure of 
Mutual Fund Transaction Costs, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,313, 68 Fed. Reg. 
74,820, 74,822 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 30. NYSE Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 67, 69 (2006); Nasdaq Stock Market, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 42 (2006). 
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by Nasdaq, and (2) the private agency market operated by a single ECN—
Instinet. The public quotes for Nasdaq stocks generally reflected only 
market maker quotations. Instinet, in contrast, generally had better prices 
than the market maker quotes, but made these prices available only to 
Instinet subscribers and not to the public. 
A natural experiment on the effect of increased equity market 
competition occurred when the SEC adopted rules to improve price 
transparency. The SEC required market makers to include in their quotes 
(or send to ECNs) customer limit orders that improved the market makers’ 
published quotes. Market makers also were required to publicly display 
their best prices, either in their own quotes or through an ECN. The SEC 
believed the new rules would, among other things, address industry 
practices that had hindered competition among markets in Nasdaq stocks.31 
The Order Handling Rules led to the creation of many new ECNs, 
which in turn transformed the market structure for Nasdaq stocks. The 
percentage of ECN trading in Nasdaq stocks rose from 9% in 1996 to 40% 
in 2003.32 The entry of these new competitors improved both the quality of 
trading services and the quality of prices for Nasdaq stocks. For example, 
market access fees fell dramatically—by approximately 80%.33 In addition, 
many economic studies found that investor transaction costs had declined 
significantly, with quoted and effective spreads declining by approximately 
30%.34 Importantly, a more competitive market structure also led to 
increased liquidity that benefited institutional investors in executing their 
large trades.35 Thus, the Order Handling Rules provide a good example of a 
regulatory change that was a “win-win” for market structure—they led to 
both a significant increase in competition among markets and a significant 
reduction in transaction costs for investors. 
When assessing the impact of the Order Handling Rules on market 
quality, one must recognize not only that there was an increased number of 
competing markets, but also that these competing markets were efficiently 
linked together through participation in a centralized, Nasdaq-operated 
trading system. The ECN quotes therefore were fully accessible to all 
participants in the dominant Nasdaq market, which allowed the ECNs to 
attract order flow both directly from subscribers and indirectly through 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg. 48,290, 
48,292 (Sept. 12, 1996). 
 32. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: DECIMAL PRICING HAS 
CONTRIBUTED TO LOWER TRADING COSTS AND A MORE CHALLENGING TRADING ENVIRONMENT 
40 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05535.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report]. 
 33. Letter from Edward J. Nicoll, CEO, Instinet Group Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 5 
(June 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71004/igi063004.pdf 
(commenting on proposed Regulation NMS). 
 34. Commission Request for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange 
Act Release No. 42,450, 65 Fed. Reg. 10,577, 10,584 (Feb. 28, 2000). 
 35. Id. at 10,585 n.53, 10,581–82. 
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Nasdaq.36 As a result, competition increased, but within the context of an 
efficient linkage that helped minimize fragmentation. 
The initiation of DTS by the LSE in 2004 provides a second natural 
experiment on the effect of increased equity market competition. The LSE 
decided to compete for trading volume in Dutch stocks in response to a 
request from Dutch trading firms for a new entrant to compete with the 
dominant Euronext exchange.37 The Dutch firms were dissatisfied with 
Euronext for a variety of reasons, including high fees and unreliable trading 
systems.38 Despite this seemingly promising opportunity for a new compet-
itor, DTS was able to divert only a very low percentage of trading volume 
from Euronext.39 One important factor that enabled Euronext to maintain its 
market share was its decision to lower trading fees by as much as 50% in 
response to the new competitor. This example of what a little competition 
can do for exchange fees is unlikely to have passed unnoticed in the U.S. 
when market participants considered the prospect of an NYSE-Nasdaq 
duopoly. 
An economic study of the DTS experience made some interesting 
findings.40 First, the study found that market quality appeared to improve 
significantly, despite the limited competitive success of DTS. While spreads 
stayed about the same, the consolidated displayed depth for the multiply-
traded Dutch stocks increased by nearly 100% after the commencement of 
quoting on both DTS and Euronext.41 Second, the study found that the 
ability of DTS to compete was hampered by an apparent failure of trading 
firms to use effective smart routers linked to DTS. For example, Euronext 
frequently traded through better-priced quotes on DTS. The study 
concluded that both the ability of DTS to compete, and the beneficial effect 
on market quality, would have been greater if more trading firms had used 
smart routers to access better-priced DTS quotes.42 A stronger duty of best 
execution might have been helpful as a means to encourage brokers to route 
their orders to better prices that were immediately and automatically 
accessible on DTS, rather than executing their customers’ orders at an 
inferior price on the dominant exchange. 
                                                                                                                 
 36. James McAndrews & Chris Stefanadis, The Emergence of Electronic Communications 
Networks in the U.S. Equity Markets, 6 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN., Oct. 2000, at 2. 
 37. U.K. COMPETITION REPORT, supra note 4, at 49–50. 
 38. COMPETITION COMM’N, PROPOSED ACQUISITION OF LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE PLC BY  
DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG OR EURONEXT NV, PROVISIONAL FINDINGS REPORT 76 (Aug. 3, 2005), 
http://www.mmc.gov.uk/inquiries/ref2005/lse/prov_find_report.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 50. 
 40. See Thierry Foucault & Albert J. Menkveld, Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order 
Routing Systems, (European Business Schools Librarians’ Group, Working Paper No. 831, 2006), 
available at http://www.hec.fr/hec/fr/professeurs_recherche/upload/cahiers/CR831Foucault.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 28.  
 42. Id. at 32. 
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A third natural experiment on the costs and benefits of competition 
among markets is provided by comparing the market structures for NYSE 
stocks and Nasdaq stocks in early 2004. The two market structures provide 
an interesting natural experiment because of their contrasting levels of 
competition and consolidation. At that time, the NYSE floor retained 
approximately a 75% share of trading in its listed stocks, while still oper-
ating a manual trading mechanism that did not offer full automated access 
to displayed quotations.43 In contrast, the market for Nasdaq stocks was 
automated, but seriously fragmented with trading volume split among many 
different markets, including Nasdaq, Inet, Arca, other ECNs, and market 
makers.44 As a result, the respective market structures for NYSE and 
Nasdaq stocks in 2004 allow one to compare the market quality of, first, a 
centralized, manual market with little effective competition, and, second, a 
highly fragmented, automated market with vigorous competition. 
As part of the Commission’s review of market structure issues for 
Regulation NMS, the Commission staff examined comparative market 
quality for NYSE and Nasdaq stocks during the first part of 2004. 
Commentators opposed to the Regulation NMS proposals had asserted that 
trading in Nasdaq stocks was more efficient than trading in NYSE stocks, 
and that therefore there was no empirical basis for the Commission to adopt 
a trade-through rule for Nasdaq stocks.45 To assess these comments, 
Commission staff analyzed a variety of indicators of market quality, 
including: short-term volatility; quoted, effective, and realized spreads; fill 
rates for marketable limit orders; and displayed depth.46 The Commission 
found that the staff studies did not support the commentators’ claim that 
trading in Nasdaq stocks was more efficient than trading in NYSE stocks. 
Rather, it concluded that both markets had weaknesses that could be 
addressed by updated and strengthened protection against trade-throughs.47 
Subsequently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), as part of its 
report on the effect of decimal trading, studied trading in NYSE and Nasdaq 
stocks and made findings that are consistent with the Commission staff’s 
studies.48 
The staff and GAO studies offer useful data for evaluating the potential 
costs of fragmentation. The staff studies found, for example, that short-term 
volatility was significantly higher for Nasdaq stocks than for comparable 
NYSE stocks, particularly for stocks that fall outside the top tier of trading 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 49,325, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,126, 11,128 (Mar. 9, 
2004) (proposing release); Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51,808, 70 Fed. Reg. 
37,517–18 (June 29, 2005) (adopting release). 
 44. Regulation NMS, 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,128 (proposing release). 
 45. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,506 (adopting release). 
 46. Id. at 37,515, 37,600. 
 47. Id. at 37,512. 
 48. See GAO Report, supra note 32. 
406 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
volume.49 Consistent with this finding, the GAO study found that displayed 
depth for Nasdaq stocks was approximately one-half of the displayed depth 
for comparable NYSE stocks.50 In addition, the GAO study found that, 
while spreads were comparable for the top tier of actively traded stocks, 
spreads in stocks with less trading volume generally were wider for Nasdaq 
stocks than NYSE stocks.51 Finally, the GAO examined the transaction cost 
data for institutional investors generated by three private vendors of 
transaction cost analyses. Consistent with GAO’s findings on displayed 
depth and spreads, the vendor data showed that institutional transaction 
costs were higher for Nasdaq stocks than NYSE stocks.52 
These three experiments suggest varying conclusions on the benefits of 
market competition and the costs of market fragmentation. The Order 
Handling Rules and DTS examples suggest that a market structure with an 
overwhelmingly dominant market can be improved by the entry of new 
competitors. The DTS example particularly suggests that MiFID could 
prompt substantial improvements in the European equity markets if, as 
intended, it successfully enables new markets to challenge the dominant 
markets for trading share in their listed stocks. But the NYSE-Nasdaq 
example suggests caution. A highly fragmented market with superior 
technology may not, in fact, produce better prices for investors than a 
manual market with significantly consolidated order flow, particularly for 
investors in the thousands of smaller companies with stocks that fall outside 
the top tier of active trading. The severity of the adverse effects of 
fragmentation may well increase as trading volume decreases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission concluded that the 
market structure for both Nasdaq and NYSE stocks would be improved—
though in different ways that reflect their current structural differences—by 
an updated and strengthened trade-through rule that protects only those 
displayed quotations that are immediately and automatically accessible.53 
The SEC noted that the new rule would promote competition by new or 
smaller markets with larger markets by assuring the markets that, if they 
display the best prices, they will attract order flow and cannot simply be 
ignored by participants in dominant markets.54 The Commission also 
expected that the new rule would help promote greater depth and liquidity 
and reduce investor transaction costs.55 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,515. 
 50. See GAO Report, supra note 32, at 33 fig.8. 
 51. See id. at 11–12 tbls.1&2. 
 52. See id. at 98–99 figs.17 & 18. 
 53. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,506. 
 54. Id. at 37,607. 
 55. See id. at 37,511–12, 37,537, 37,606–07. 
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Events since the adoption of Regulation NMS indicate that the prospect 
of strengthened trade-through protection has boosted the competitive 
opportunities of smaller markets. The effects of the new rule on market 
quality and investor transaction costs, however, remain to be seen. These 
effects will play out over the coming months as the new trade-through rule 
is fully implemented. It will be quite interesting to see the new data, 
generated by another natural experiment, on the effects of regulatory 
change on equity market competition and fragmentation. 
